

Logic in Computer Science III

Lesson 6, automated theorem proving

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Recall:

Theorem (Herbrand's Theorem)

Let A be a prenex sentence, let

$$He(A) := \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n \psi(x_1, \dots, x_n).$$

Then A is logically valid iff there exist *terms* t_{ij} such that

$$\bigvee_{j=1}^m \psi(t_{1j}, \dots, t_{nj})$$

is a *propositional tautology*.

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This reduces the task of proving a theorem to

1. finding suitable terms, and
2. proving a propositional tautology.

We want to use Resolution to prove the Herbrand disjunction.

But

- ▶ searching randomly, or systematically, for terms and then trying to prove the disjunction in Resolution

is not a good strategy, because we will generate a lot of useless terms.

There is a better approach:

- ▶ look for terms that enable us to do resolution steps.

Resolution in first order logic

Example

The pair of clauses

$$A \vee P(f(x), y), \quad B \vee \neg P(z, g(u))$$

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By successive substitutions we eventually obtain the term needed.

unification of terms

- ▶ a **substitution** is a mapping $\sigma : \text{Variables} \rightarrow \text{Terms}$
- ▶ for a term t , $\sigma(t)$ denotes the term obtained by substitution σ
- ▶ σ is a **unifier** of a pair of terms s, t if $\sigma(s) = \sigma(t)$
- ▶ σ is a **most general unifier (MGU)** of a pair of terms s, t if $\sigma(s) = \sigma(t)$ and for every unifier τ there exists ρ such that $\tau = \rho\sigma$.

examples

- ▶ $\sigma = \{y \mapsto g(u), z \mapsto f(x)\}$ is an MGU of $P(f(x), y)$ and $P(z, g(u))$.
- ▶ x and $f(x)$ cannot be unified.
- ▶ $f(s_1, \dots, s_n)$ and $g(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ cannot be unified if $f \neq g$.

Theorem

If there exists a unifier, then there exists an MGU.

Theorem

There exists an algorithm that either finds an MGU, or outputs “NO unifier”. The algorithm runs in polynomial time in the input and output size. (The output may be exponentially larger than the input.)

See Buss's chapter.

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Strategy: *use only MGUs as substitutions.*

However, we may need to substitute different variables in order to enable unification.

Example (of substituting variables)

Consider clauses

$$Q(x, z) \vee P(x), \quad R(x) \vee \neg P(f(x)).$$

We cannot unify x with $f(x)$, but we can first apply substitution $x \rightarrow y$ to get

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Example (of factoring)

$$\frac{\frac{Q(z, x) \vee P(x) \vee P(f(z))}{Q(z, f(z)) \vee P(f(z)) \vee P(f(z))}}{Q(z, f(z)) \vee P(f(z))} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{unification of } x \text{ and } f(z) \\ \text{contraction} \end{array}$$

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Exercise

Define a general rule that would join factoring, unification, and resolution into one step.

how to prove a sentence Φ

1. put Φ in to **prenex form** with the matrix¹ in the DNF form,

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Exercise

Prove that every sentence can be proved using this (nondeterministic) procedure.

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example

$$\exists x(\neg P(0) \vee (P(x) \wedge \neg P(Sx)) \vee P(S^n 0))$$

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Herbrand's theorem gives us:

$$\neg P(0) \vee$$

$$(P(0) \wedge \neg P(S0)) \vee (P(S0) \wedge \neg P(SS0)) \vee (P(SS0) \wedge \neg P(SSS0)) \vee \dots$$

$$\vee P(S^n(0))$$

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Herbrand's theorem gives us:

$$\begin{aligned} &\neg P(0) \vee \\ &(P(0) \wedge \neg P(S0)) \vee (P(S0) \wedge \neg P(SS0)) \vee (P(SS0) \wedge \neg P(SSS0)) \vee \dots \\ &\qquad\qquad\qquad \vee P(S^n(0)) \end{aligned}$$

Claim. Every Herbrand's disjunction must contain all terms $0, S0, SS0, \dots, S^n 0$.

Proof.

Suppose it does not contain $S^i 0$ for $0 < i < n$. Define a truth assignment by

- ▶ $P(S^j 0) \mapsto \text{true}$, for $j < i$,
- ▶ $P(S^j 0) \mapsto \text{false}$, for $j > i$.

Then all disjuncts are falsified. □

example, contd.

But first-order resolution is more efficient. Suppose $n = 2^k$.

²we use $\dots \rightarrow \dots$ instead of $\neg \dots \vee \dots$, resolution becomes transitivity of \rightarrow

example, contd.

But first-order resolution is more efficient. Suppose $n = 2^k$.

1. $P(x) \rightarrow P(S(x))$ (initial clause)²
2. $P(Sx) \rightarrow P(SS(x))$ (substitution $x \mapsto Sx$)
3. $P(x) \rightarrow P(SS(x))$ (resolution of 1 and 2)
4. $P(SSx) \rightarrow P(SSSS(x))$ (substitution $x \mapsto SSx$)
5. $P(x) \rightarrow P(SSSS(x))$ (resolution of 3 and 4)
- ...
- $2k+1$. $P(x) \rightarrow P(S^{2^k}(x))$
- $2k+2$. $P(0) \rightarrow P(S^{2^k}(0))$ (substitution $x \mapsto 0$)
- $2k+3$. $P(0)$ (initial clause)
- $2k+4$. $P(S^{2^k}(0))$ (resolution of $2k+2$ and $2k+3$)
- $2k+5$. $\neg P(S^{2^k}(0))$ (initial clause)
- $2k+6$. \perp (resolution of $2k+4$ and $2k+5$)

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example, contd.

But where is unification?

example, contd.

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An alternative view:

1. $P(x) \rightarrow P(S(x))$ (initial clause)
2. $P(y) \rightarrow P(S(y))$ (substitution $x \mapsto y$)
3. $P(Sx) \rightarrow P(SS(x))$ (**unification** of $S(x)$ and y)
4. $P(x) \rightarrow P(SS(x))$ (resolution of 1 and 3)
5. ...

an important improvement of efficiency

Theorem

Let A_1, \dots, A_n be prenex sentences. Then

$$\vdash A_1 \vee \dots \vee A_n \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \vdash He(A_1) \vee \dots \vee He(A_n)$$

Proof.

- **exercise**



an important improvement of efficiency

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Proof.

- **exercise**



Corollary

Let A_1, \dots, A_n, B be prenex sentences. Then

$$A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \vdash Sk(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge Sk(A_n) \rightarrow He(B).$$

modification of the procedure

for derivations from axioms $A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B$

1. Skolemize A_1, \dots, A_n
2. put the matrices of $Sk(A_1), \dots, Sk(A_n)$ into CNF forms
3. Herbrandize B
4. put the **negation** of the matrix of $He(B)$ into a CNF form
5. — the rest is the same

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See examples in *Symbolic Logic and Mechanical Theorem Proving* by C.-L. Chang, R. C.-T. Lee.³

³chang-lee-examples.pdf

the completeness theorem from Herbrand's theorem

- ▶ We had assumed that the sequent calculus was complete, when we proved Herbrand's theorem.
- ▶ Now we will prove it without this assumption.
- ▶ This gives us
 1. model-theoretical proof of Herbrand's theorem
 2. and completeness of the sequent calculus w.r.t. prenex sentences
- ▶ We can prove in the sequent calculus that every sentence is equivalent to a prenex sentence, hence we get completeness for the sequent calculus for all sentences.

Theorem

Let A be a prenex sentence and let ψ be the matrix of $He(A)$.
Suppose that for no m and no terms t_{ij} ,

$$\bigvee_{j=1}^m \psi(t_{1j}, \dots, t_{nj})$$

is a propositional tautology. Then there exists a model M such that

$$M \models \neg A.$$

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$$M \models \neg A.$$

We will actually prove

$$M \models Sk(\text{prenex}(\neg A)).$$

We know that $\vdash Sk(B) \rightarrow B$ for prenex formulas.

We will assume that the sequent calculus is complete for propositional logic.

Proof.

Let A be given, and let $\psi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ be the matrix of $He(A)$.

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Then $Sk(\text{prenex}(\neg A)) = \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n \neg \psi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$.

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If there is no Herbrand disjunction witnessing the validity of A , we need a model M such that

$$M \models \neg \psi[a_1, \dots, a_n] \quad \text{for all } a_1, \dots, a_n \in M.$$

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Construction of the model

- ▶ the universe of M : all **terms**
- ▶ a constant c is interpreted as c
- ▶ a function symbol f is interpreted as the function $t_1, \dots, t_k \mapsto f(t_1, \dots, t_k)$
- ▶ interpretation of predicates and relations: we need to assign **truth values to atomic formulas** $R(t_1, \dots, t_l)$ so that all propositions $\psi(t_1, \dots, t_k)$ are evaluated **false**.

See next page:

interpretation of predicates and relations

- ▶ Since no Herbrand disjunction is a tautology, we have for every m and every finite set of terms $t_{i,j}$ an assignment that falsifies all $\psi(t_{1,j}, \dots, t_{n,j})$, $j = 1, \dots, m$.

interpretation of predicates and relations

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- ▶ By **the compactness of the propositional calculus**, we have an assignment a to all atomic formulas such that a falsifies **all** propositions $\psi(t_1, \dots, t_n)$.
- ▶ So we define the relations using a as follows
 $M \models R(t_1, \dots, t_l)$ iff $a : R(t_1, \dots, t_l) \mapsto \top$.

Thus we get

$$M \models \neg\psi[a_1, \dots, a_n] \quad \text{for all } a_1, \dots, a_n \in M.$$



We proved

Theorem

A prenex sentence A is logically valid iff there exists a tautological Herbrand disjunction for A .

It remains to prove:

Lemma

If there exists a tautological Herbrand disjunction for A , then A is provable in the sequent calculus.

Proof.

Let the disjunction be given.

- ▶ for every term consider all maximal subterms that start with some Herbrand function symbol and replace them by a free variable; the same terms by the same variable, different by different
- ▶ the substitution preserves provability in the propositional calculus, so assuming that the propositional part of the sequent calculus is complete, we get a proof of the sequent with the substituted terms
- ▶ now we introduce quantifiers as follows
 1. whenever it is possible to contract, we contract, otherwise
 2. whenever it is possible to introduce \exists we do it, otherwise
 3. we introduce \forall

It remains to prove the following claim:



Claim The procedure only stops when the sequent becomes A .

Proof.

We need to show that we can introduce \forall if no contraction or \exists -introduction is possible and the sequent is not A yet.

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In such a situation, in each formula B , different from A , we can only introduce \forall provided that the free b variable does not occur elsewhere. So we need to show that there exist at least one B whose b does not occur elsewhere.

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In such a situation, in each formula B , different from A , we can only introduce \forall provided that the free b variable does not occur elsewhere. So we need to show that there exist at least one B whose b does not occur elsewhere.

We take B whose b corresponds to the most complex term t . For some Herbrand function h , B and t have the form

$$t := h(\dots s_i \dots) \quad \text{and} \quad B := \Box \psi(\dots s_i \dots b \dots),$$

where \Box is some prefix of quantifiers. Clearly

1. since t cannot occur as a proper subterm in any term at this stage, so does b
2. t cannot be equal to a term in any other formula, because t encodes terms s_i , hence the formula would have to be equal, but we have contracted equal formulas.

We get the completeness of other proof system by **simulating the sequent calculus**.

complexity issues

We know that PHP requires exponential size Resolution proofs, while it has polynomial size proofs in the standard proof systems such as the sequent and Frege calculi.

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Theorem

There exists a sequence of logically valid sentences ϕ_n such that

- 1. ϕ_n have polynomial size proofs in the sequent calculus with cuts, and Hilbert style calculi, but*
- 2. every cut-free proof, or Herbrand disjunction for ϕ_n has size at least*

$$2^{2^{2^{\dots^2}}} \} n \text{ times.}$$

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This also applies to Robinson's first-order resolution, maybe, with one 2 in the stack less.